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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS. By Edward Westermarck, Ph. D. Vol I. London: Macmillan & Co., 1906, pp. xxi, 716.

The greater part of this very interesting volume consists in an enormous collection of instances of moral judgments, collected from all parts of the world, and from all epochs of history, and classified under various heads. Several chapters, however, raise general ethical problems.

The first chapter opens with the remark, "That the moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions, either of indignation or approval, is a fact which a certain school of thinkers have in vain attempted to deny" (p. 14). Not only one school of thinkers, but many schools, and many thinkers who belong to no school in particular, have not only attempted to deny this, but have succeeded in doing so with the greatest ease. Presumably, Dr. Westermarck means that their denials have been mistaken, but for this view he offers no arguments. Dr. Westermarck's subjectivism is complete. Our emotions are not merely the criterion of right and wrong but their essence. An action is only good, if it is approved, while it is approved, and for the man who approves it. It is recognized that consequently "there can be no moral truth in the sense in which this term is generally understood."

The second chapter declares that all moral emotions are retributive emotions, though not all retributive emotions are moral. In the third chapter Dr. Westermarck discusses theories of punishment. He endeavors to show that the retributive theory is necessary, because without it we should be compelled to award and withhold punishment in a manner which would be recognized as unsuitable. His arguments are at any rate ingenious. Unfortunately space forbids any discussion of them.

In chapter 4 the moral emotions are distinguished from others, the test being that moral emotions are disinterested and impartial. Their origin is ascribed in the same chapter to the indignation which arises at the breach of custom, and, to a lesser extent, to the approval which arises at the observance of custom.

The sixth chapter covers a surprising amount of subjects in a small space. Bad, vice, and wrong; ought and duty; right; rights and duties; injustice and justice; good; virtue; merit; the super-obligatory—all these concepts are analyzed within twenty-seven pages. We have only time to note that Dr. Westermarck's sub-

jectivism drives him to define "good" as what is approved, and consequently to hold that the performance of a duty, when too common to excite approbation, is right without being good.

In the seventh chapter the historical side of the book becomes more prominent in a discussion of the development of judicial punishment and judicial organization. In the eighth chapter we pass to the discussion of what is held to be a proper subject for moral judgments. It is maintained that "moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event but the intention" (p. 205). He defines intention, however, in such a way as to practically identify it with motive (pp. 204, 207).

The same subject is considered in chapter 9, where instances are given of how far different nations considered accidental acts or omissions to be punishable, and how far they have confined punishment to acts which have been explicitly willed. In chapter 10 the responsibility of "agents under intellectual disability" is discussed. Among the many cases of trials of animals which Dr. Westermarck has collected, perhaps the most delightful is one of a sow and her six young ones in 1457. "The sow, being found guilty, was condemned to death; the young pigs were acquitted on account of their youth and the bad example of their mother" (p. 257).

In the next two chapters the author deals with the extent to which such circumstances as compulsion, self-defence, and the like, are allowed to affect the condemnation of crimes, and with the extent to which we are held responsible for the unexpected consequences of careless actions.

In chapter 14 the subject of Free Will is discussed. Dr. Westermarck holds that "a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free will" (p. 322). This is, on his theory, equivalent to the assertion that actions are none the less morally good or bad because they are completely determined. In discussing the causes which have led to the denial of this view, Dr. Westermarck introduces a very clear account of the distinction between determinism and fatalism. "According to the fatalist, the innate character is *compelled*; hence personal responsibility is out of the question. According to the determinist, the innate character is caused; but this has nothing whatever to do with the question of responsibility" (p. 326).

Dr. Westermarck, however, seems curiously mistaken about Spinoza's position. On page 322, after saying, as quoted above,

that a retributive emotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free-will, he continues "I hold that Spinoza is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more love or hatred toward one another than towards anything else, because they think themselves to be free." This passage would give the idea that Spinoza believed in free will, whereas no philosopher was ever a more rigid determinist (cp. "Ethics" II, 48. "In the mind there is no absolute or free will"). And so far is he from holding that our emotions towards men would be more intense if we conceived them as undetermined, that he says exactly the opposite; "an emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary, is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary" (IV. 11). It is true, as Dr. Westermarck says, that Spinoza also holds (III, 49, note) that "men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else." But free, with Spinoza, does not mean undetermined, as it does with the supporters of free-will. It simply means self-determined. (I Def., 7, "That thing is called free which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone.")

The second half of the volume is devoted to the examination of the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and the judgment passed on these modes of conduct by different people in different ages. The author groups these modes of conduct into six groups. The first of these includes the conduct which directly concerns the interests of other men, and the second the conduct which chiefly concerns the agent's own welfare. All acts, however, which concern sexual relations are withdrawn from these two classes, and form the third. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, which they regard as supernatural. The present volume deals with the first class only. The chief place is naturally assigned to Homicide, the general consideration of which occupies three chapters. Then follow Parricide and Infanticide, the Stealing of Women and of Slaves, Human Sacrifice, Capital Punishment, and Dueling. After Death comes the question of Bodily Injuries. Then we pass to Charity and Generosity, and to Hospitality. The Subjection of Children, the Subjection of Wives, and Slavery conclude the volume.

The mass of information included in these chapters is wonderful. The use which Dr. Westermarck makes of it I have no pretensions to criticise. At any rate, everyone who reads this volume will look forward with impatience to the next.

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A NEW MORALITY. By Arthur Tisdall Turner. London: Grant Richards, 1904. Pp. 48.

A man who happens to be a member of the "thinking world" (for whom this book was written) will open his eyes in wonder on seeing its title "A New Morality." When he opens the book and reads in the preface that it is the net result of seven years concentrated thought, and that only the "most robust intellectual constitutions" can assimilate the mental food which it contains, he will, unless he be an exceptionally reckless man, shut the book again. If, however, the threat of a shock to his "religious susceptibilities," induces him to read it, he will find that the concentrated wisdom which the author offers is of the following kind: "The commands thundered from Mount Sinai, the moral precepts inculcated in the Sermon on the Mount, the eightfold path taught from the wisdom garnered beneath the Bo tree of Ind—these and many like them are but expressions of individual opinion, and represent to the 'truly enlightened' nothing more and nothing less." Again, "Whatever you desire to do, that do; and whatever you do, do it without regret." Our adviser forgets the existence of police courts; and the possible inclination of a fellow "desirer" to thrash us also escapes his notice.

Mr. Turner has concentrated too much. He should have looked out a little on the world, and passed more of the seven years in the company of the "old" moralists. Had he done so I am sure that he would not have repeated these commonplaces, and with such tragic emphasis.

RADYR, CARDIFF.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

THE POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE MEREDITH: By G. M. Trevelyan. London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1906. Pp. xiv, 234.

This book ought to be of great service to those of Meredith's readers, and they are many, who wish to grasp a view of life that